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This thesis explores practical and theoretical aspects of several privacy-providing technolo-
gies, including tools for anonymous web-browsing, verifiable electronic voting schemes,
and private information retrieval from databases. State-of-art privacy-providing schemes
are frequently impractical for implementational reasons or for sheer information-theoretical
reasons due to the amount of information that needs to be transmitted. We have been re-
searching the question of whether relaxing the requirements o such schemes, in particular
settling for imperfect but sufficient in real-world situations privacy, as opposed to perfect
privacy, may be helpful in producing more practical or more effici nt schemes.
This thesis presents three results. The first result is the introduction of caching as a
technique for providing anonymous web-browsing at the costof acrificing some function-
ality provided by anonymizing systems that do not use caching. The second result is a
coercion-resistant electronic voting scheme with nearly perfect privacy and nearly perfect
voter verifiability. The third result consists of some lowerbounds and some simple upper
bounds on the amount of communication in nearly private information retrieval schemes;
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Introduction
This thesis explores practical and theoretical aspects of several privacy-providing technolo-
gies, including tools for anonymous web-browsing, verifiable electronical voting schemes,
and private information retrieval from databases. State-of-the-art privacy-providing schemes
are frequently impractical for implementational or sheer information-theoretical reasons.
We have been researching the question of whether relaxing the requirements on such schemes,
in particular settling for imperfect but sufficient in certain real-world situations privacy as
opposed to perfect privacy, may be helpful in producing morepractical or more efficient
schemes.
This thesis presents updated and extended versions of threepap rs: “Using caching for
browsing anonymity” by Anna Shubina and Sean Smith [SS03], “Design and prototype of
a coercion-resistant, voter verifiable electronic voting system” by Anna Shubina and Sean
Smith [SS04], and “Nearly private information retrieval” by Amit Chakrabarti and Anna
Shubina [CS07].
In Chapter 1 we introduce caching as a technique for providing anonymous web-browsing
as presented in [SS03]. Web caches are quite common but generally not used for anonymiza-
tion despite having useful properties that other anonymizing systems lack. This chapter also
contains an overview of various techniques that solve the same problem and points out their
deficiencies. We describe our prototype, which uses Google cache. This work was done
under the supervision of Sean Smith.
Chapter 2 covers our work on coercion-resistant verifiable electronic voting as presented
in [SS04]. In this chapter we describe an electronic voting scheme that addresses the con-
viii
tradiction between verifiability and receipt-freeness (being unable to prove to anyone how
the voter voted) by relying on the information in the voter’shead. In this scheme, privacy
of the voter’s choices is not perfect but likely to be sufficient in a real-world situation. We
describe our prototype. This work was also done under the suprvision of Sean Smith.
Chapter 3 presents an extended version of our paper [CS07] onnearly private infor-
mation retrieval. Before our work on nearly private information retrieval, almost all of the
bounds for communication complexity on private information schemes assumed that the
schemes leak no information about the index requested. We were able to obtain some lower
and upper bounds on schemes that allow leaking a small amountof information.
In Chapter 3 the following results in nearly private information retrieval are presented.
• We derive a simple upper bound in the 1-server case. This bound is essentially opti-
mal. We use this bound to obtain an upper bound in the 2-servercase.
• We prove a linear lower bound in the 1-server case.
• We prove a linear lower bound in the 2-server case. This boundis an improvement
over a lower bound shown in [GKST02] by Goldreich et al.
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Chapter 1
Using caching for browsing
anonymity
In the first part of my graduate work I was studying tools that provide anonymity on the
internet.
Privacy-providing tools, including tools that provide anonymity, are gaining popularity
in the modern world. The goals of the users of such tools vary widely, from avoiding
tracking and profiling to avoiding internet censorship. Thereactions of businesses to the
spread of such tools vary widely as well: whereas some busines es are unhappy with the
growth of privacy-enhancing technologies, others can use lack of information about their
users to avoid unnecessary liability and even possible harassment by parties with contrary
business interests and to gain a competitive market edge.
An interesting subproblem of the more general problem of providing anonymity on the
internet is the problem of anonymous web-browsing. A systemallowing anonymous web-
browsing should respond in real time, as opposed to, for example, anonymous e-mail that
allows delayed traffic. The requirement of real-time respones makes certain attacks much
easier than they would have been otherwise.
Currently, users interested in anonymous web-browsing have to choose between single-
hop proxies and the few more complex systems that are available. The single-hop proxies
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leave the user to rely on the provider of the service for not disclosing his data and also
leave him or her vulnerable to adversaries watching both thetraffic before the proxy and
the traffic at the destination. The more complex systems havemore points where they
can be attacked and are arguably vulnerable (although, possibly harder to attack) in more
scenarios. For example, the state-of-the-art system in thefield of anonymous web-browsing
is Tor (tor.eff.org ). Tor works by letting the user obtain the list of routers from the
directory server, having the user select a path of 3 random nodes and route his traffic to
the destination through the path. In this scenario the adversary can be almost anywhere
– on the servers, between them, at the destination, between th user and the first node,
perhaps anywhere except the directory servers which are suppo ed to be honest (although
the machines on the path to them may not be). What is even worse, a sophisticated adversary
would be able to record traffic day after day for later analysis, and since the real users tend
to have distinguishable web-browsing patterns, such long-term recording puts them at risk
of deanonymization. In the situation where the adversary isable to watch many nodes,
including a number of entrance and exit points, this kind of attack (calledthe long-term
intersection attack) becomes a major problem not fully addressed by any existingreal-time
web-browsing anonymizing systems.
In the paper “Using caching for browsing anonymity” (A.M. Shubina and S.W. Smith,
2003), we suggested to use for anonymization a well-known scheme that was not com-
monly used in that manner. Our idea took care of long-term intersection attacks by putting
some limitations on the user’s web-browsing. Namely, we proposed and prototyped a
caching proxy system for allowing users to retrieve data from the World-Wide Web in a
way similar to many web caches such as Google (oogle.com ) or WayBack Machine
(archive.org ). The system works by allowing the user to see only the cachedversions
of all the data, retrieved by the caching proxy independently of the user activity on the
proxy. In this system the actual destination and any observers b fore the destination see no
traffic that can be correlated with the user’s activity. If the user’s traffic going to the caching
proxy is encrypted, an observer between the user and the caching proxy sees nothing except
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whatever patterns can be glimpsed from the encrypted traffic. Thus our system provides
recipient unobservability by a third party and sender unobservability by the recipient, dis-
posing with intersection attacks.
We built a prototype of such a caching proxy by rerouting all user requests to Google
cache (which, unfortunately, does not accept encrypted traffic).
1.1 Available anonymizing services
Following the recent political and economic developments,from increased consumer profil-
ing for many ends and purposes (see, for example, [Ele03]) toplans of the US Government
for Terrorism Information Awareness (formerly Total Information Awareness, see [DAR03]),
a number of previously unconcerned people started to contemplate being more careful with
exposing or giving out any information about themselves. A number of businesses that have
been collecting data about their customers have also taken damage from adversary parties.
It is no longer a purely hypothetic possibility that a vendorof electronic equipment will find
his web logs subpoenaed on murky legal grounds. An example isth DirecTV case, where
customer lists of a number of different companies that sold smart cards were seized, and
people on these lists accused of piracy [Pou03].
The lack of privacy of transactions on the web being well-know (as documented, for
example, at [Ele97]), and more people are now starting to tryse vices that claim to provide
anonymous browsing on the web, such asanonymizer.com or the-cloak.com .
There currently exist a number of very different services - free or paid, with more or
fewer features and paranoia, with better or worse performance, with bigger or smaller quo-
tas - which claim that they would anonymize the web browsing of their users. Looking
closer, however, one cannot help noticing that most of them are b sed on the same underly-
ing assumptions, the same attacker model, and the same design.
The few more complicated systems that consider a more powerful attacker require extra
software download and setup from the user (and some of them may also come with extra
obligations, such as automated request-forwarding in caseof Crowds [RR98]). Of these
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more complicated systems, we are aware of only three that arecur ntly publicly available:
Tor [DMS04], homepage athttp://tor.eff.org , JAP [BFK01], available athttp:
//anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index en.html , and I2P, homepage ath tp://
www.i2p.net .
The first commercial mix-net, Freedom Network [GS01] went offline permanently [SG00]
in 2001; the homepage of Crowds is currently offline, and the resource itself appears to be
unavailable. Although Tor has gained public appreciation and is gaining servers and users,
its installation may not be an option for many users who are not fully in control of their
computers; it is also far from invulnerable to traffic analysis, as demonstrated, for example,
by Murdoch and Danezis [MD05]. JAP and I2P come with the same cav ats as Tor.
The situation has not changed much since the publication of our paper [SS03]. A user
concerned about his privacy still does not have many options. In our paper, we considered
the following question: what are the simplest anonymizing systems really giving a user
in search of protection, and is there a way to get better protecti n than is given by such
systems?
1.2 Anonymity and unobservability
In the terms of [PK00],anonymity is the state of not being identifiable within a set of sub-
jects. Sender anonymitymeans that the sender of the message cannot be identified, whereas
recipient anonymitymeans that the recipient of the message cannot be identified.Unlink-
ability of sender and recipientmeans that it cannot be pinpointed that a given sender and
recipient are communicating with each other. Even strongerthan anonymity,unobservabil-
ity means that the existence of the message itself cannot be detected. Sender (or recipient)
unobservabilitymeans that it is impossible to detect whether any sender (recipient) from
the set of subjects is sending (receiving), whereasr lationship unobservabilitymeans that
it is impossible to detect the existence of a message sent from a possible sender to a possible
recipient.
For this definition to work, one needs to consider also two concepts: that ofthe at-
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tackeragainst whom anonymity is achieved and ofthe degree of anonymity(as described,
for example, in [RR98]), the certainty with which the attacker can pinpoint the sender, the
recipient, or link them to each other. The attackers can bepassive- merely watching the
traffic, or active- capable of inserting their own traffic. They can belocal, watching only
one node or wire, orglobal, watching multiple nodes or wires. They can watch traffic over
short or long periods of time. Theoretical treatments also need to consider the computa-














Figure 1.1: Single-hop proxy
1.3 Anonymizing services on the World-Wide Web
Single-hop proxy functionality.
Most anonymizing services currently available to the general public are at their base
merely single-hop proxies that make the http request for theuser. Figure 1.1 illustrates the
operation of such a proxy. While using a single-hop proxy, the user submits the destination
URL to the service, and the service immediately issues an http request to this URL. The
http request appears to have originated not at the user’s computer but at the proxy. As
the target computer replies, sending back an html document,the proxy sends back to the
user this document with all links rewritten so that they point back to the proxy, not to the
sites they originally pointed to. This means that when using, for example, the free part of
anonymizer.com , a link tohttp://www.somesite.org gets rewritten, becoming
http://anon.free.anonymizer.com/http://www.somesite .org .
The connection of the user to the proxy may or may not be encrypted. Some services
(see, for example,the-cloak.com )provide both; some (see, for example,anonymizer.
com) provide only unencrypted surfing for free and charge for encypted surfing.
Besides concealing the user’s IP and possibly encryption, functionality of anonymizing
single-hop proxies may include: filtering out or specially handling cookies; filtering out or
rewriting JavaScript, Java, or other active content; filtering out advertisements and banners;
proxying or blocking https; faking the httpuseragent field in the http header (that is, not








Guardster http://www.guardster.com paid version only
Table 1.1: Some available single-hop proxies as of December2007
is, not disclosing the previously visited site).
Single-hop proxy examples.Table 1.1 lists a few available services. Note that most
such proxies are not run by businesses that have obligation to keep them up, and therefore
may appear and disappear unpredictably. Some of these services (such as, for example,
anonymizer.com ) have been subject to public review for a long time and have a reputa-
tion for not violating their users’ privacy. For others, cave t emptor may apply.
Worth mention in the category of single-hop proxies is Google’s translation service de-
spite the fact that by itself it does not provide anonymity. Idoes rewrite links in the trans-
lated document to point at links to translations of the documents pointed to by the original
links, but it does not handle links to non-text components. In the absence of non-text com-
ponents, for example if the browser is configured to load onlytext, Google’s translation
service serves as a single-hop anonymizing proxy, making all the requests to the destination
site instead of the user.
Single-hop proxy attacker model.A single-hop proxy attempts to protect the identity
of the sender of a request from the attacker who can monitor the traffic of the destination
site.
What this really means is, that leaving aside bugs and faultsin design or implementation
that may make such services able to disclose the informationthey claim to conceal (an
example is in [MS02]) and leaving aside their additional content filtering capabilities, the
main function of a single-hop proxy is the concealment of theus r’s IP from the site he or
she accesses.
The destination site can do traffic analysis (see, for example, [SK02] or [Ray01]) to
7
learn about and from the user’s browsing patterns. The site can see what paths the user
takes inside it (communication pattern attack), the intervals of time between requests (tim-
ing attack), and the amount of transmitted data (packet volume and counting attack), as
discussed in [SK02]. The site may also be able to correlate diff rent accesses by the same
user that occur at different times (intersection attack).
Single-hop proxies also do not address the model of the attacker who may be watching
user’s traffic as it goes from the user to the proxy and from theproxy to the user. Sometimes
the proxy does not encrypt such traffic, allowing any observer on the path the full view of
what is going on.
Even if the traffic from the user to the proxy and back is encrypted, the global attacker
that is able to watch both the user-proxy and the proxy-destination sides of the proxy might
be able to see what data the user requests and gets by doing traffic an lysis on the ingoing
and outgoing traffic.
Going beyond a single-hop proxy.In 1981, Chaum introduced the concept of “Mix-
nets” (see [Cha81]). “Mix-nets” are groups of servers that provide anonymity by passing
user’s traffic through nodes calledMixes which may delay, reorder, reencrypt, pad and
forward traffic passing through them. In addition to providing sender anonymity, Mix-nets
attempt also to provide sender and recipient unlinkabilityagainst a global attacker. Among
the examples of Mix-nets are Onion Routing [SGR97], Zero Knowledge Systems’ Freedom
Network [GS01], Web MIXes [BFK01], Tarzan [FM02], and I2P (http://www.i2p.
net ).
Among the other approaches to the problem of anonymous web transactions is the
Crowds system [RR98], which allows participating nodes to forward requests within their
crowd with a certain probability. Crowds attempt to providesender and recipient anonymity,
but unlike the Mix-nets, they do not attempt to provide sender and recipient unlinkability
against a global attacker.
A problem: long-term intersection attacks. A subset of intersection attacks and a ma-
jor unsolved problem in anonymity systems are so-called “long-term intersection attacks”
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(see [BL02]), where the attacker is able to watch all or many nodes, including a number of
entrance and exit points of the users’ traffic. Users tend to have a certain behaviour while
on-line. They tend to send messages to same or similar destinations. If userA in a mix daily
reads a certain site, after very many observations it may be possible to matchA with the
outgoing request to that site, using the knowledge ofA’s presence orA’s absence together
with the information whether or not the site was visited during that time.
One of the directions for dealing with this is dummy traffic (as discussed in [BL02],
[JVZ01]). Dummy traffic consists of messages sent even when tuser has nothing to
send. A totally different approach is proposed in PipeNet [Dai98], where the whole mix-
net is supposed to shut down when one node stops to communicate with the network.
1.4 Using caching for anonymity
We propose an anonymizing web-browsing system that would deal with the global attacker
who is able to do long-term observation. The proposal is to make user requests to proxy
independent in time from the proxy’s requests to target sites. The proxy will request and
cache information on its own and send it to the users when requested. To achieve this,
the proxy server would collect and store documents which itsusers are likely to request,
provide an encrypted channel to access its contents, and rewrite links in the documents
provided to the user to point back at the proxy, similarly to the workings of an ordinary
single-hop proxy. This would mean that a global observer looking at the traffic to and from
the server will see only regularly scheduled cache updates and encrypted user traffic, thus
removing correlation between the users requests and the serv r’ accesses to remote sites.
This caching proxy will act like a single-hop proxy, in that the destination server does
not find out who communicated with it except for the proxy. Butit does more than the
single-hop proxy in many other respects: the destination server does not find out that some-
one except the caching proxy communicated with it at all, andneither does a third-party
observer; the global attacker cannot correlate requests from the sender and to the recipient;















recipient 3rd party sender 3rd party
Single-hop
proxies
yes no no no no yes
Mix-nets yes yes no yes short-term no
Crowds yes yes no yes no no
Unencrypted
caching1
yes no no no no yes
Encrypted
caching1
yes yes no yes yes yes
Table 1.2: Anonymizing systems compared
proxy’s fetches and the user’s requests.
In short, the attacker model includes not only the attacker at the destination site (as
that of existing single-hop proxies) but also the global attacker who is able to do not only
short-term, but also long-term attacks.
Similarly to the existing single-hop proxies, the user willnot be protected from the
attacker at the proxy itself.
Such a proxy would compare with the existing anonymity services as described in Ta-
ble 1.2.
1.5 Similar work and candidates for a prototype
Caching proxies that periodically update their content. The best known example of a
caching proxy that collects data on its own for future use is Google’s cache [Goo]. Every
few weeks it crawls all the web, collecting, storing and indexing text information from
every webpage [BP98]. Attempting to scale to the size of the wole World Wide Web, it
has been optimized for memory usage and speed.
Google’s primary objective is indexing text information. It does make the attempt to
index images but only caches thumbnail images, relying on the original image being still
1Proposed for providing anonymity in this paper.
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present on the server. Such usage may be due also to data size considerations, but there
are also legal reasons for it. In a recent case, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that it is legal for search engines to cache thumbnail images[Ols03a], but it is yet to be
determined whether it is legal to cache a full-size image copy. According to the Court, the
use of thumbnail images is fair use, because they “do not supplant the need for originals”
and “benefit the public by enhancing information-gatheringtechniques on the Internet”.
Other search engines that allow access to their caches are Com t Web Search [Com]
2 and Gigablast [Gig]. An interesting web cache is Wayback Machine [Way]. This is an
internet archive that contains multiple copies of webpagesfrom 1997 to 2002. Similarly
to the caches of search engines, it cannot be directly used for anonymous browsing. Us-
ing JavaScript, Wayback Machine handles links to point backto the cache where archived
versions are available, but if that fails, it sends the request to the original site.
“Using Google cache as anonymous surf”.The idea of using Google cache for
anonymity has occurred to Google’s users before, but Google’s design is not targetted to-
wards this goal. Written apparently as a result of such attemp s, an FAQ entitled ’Don’t Use
the Google Cache as Anonymous Surf’ [The03] explains that clicking on a link in a cached
page would lead you to a page outside Google cache, an embedded image would attempt to
load directly from the original site, and redirection mightmake the whole page load from
the original site. In order to use Google cache for anonymity, our scheme eliminates all
outgoing links.
1.6 Prototype
We prototyped3 an anonymizing caching proxy that outsources all caching toGo gle by
forwarding all requests to Google cache and rewriting linksi the resulting documents. As
shown in Figure 1.2, when a URL is submitted to the script, thescript requests a cached
2Comet Web Search stopped allowing access to their cache sometime after the submission of this article.
The reasons for this are unknown to the authors.
3The prototype is athttp://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/ ∼ashubina/google.html . It is a CGI















Figure 1.2: Anonymizing caching proxy
copy from the Google cache. Any link in the document gets rewritten to submit the link to
this script, instead of going directly to the requested page. Thus, if we deal with plain text
data, every request would be redirected to the Google cache.
The implementation has to detect all outward going links, detect their data type and to
rewrite them according to whether their content may be availble from Google cache.
Since Google cache does not store images, images are not provided unless the user
explicitly specifies that he or she wants the script to act like a single-hop proxy that fetches
images for him from the destination server. Such a transaction would make the destination
server aware that somebody is accessing the content and disclose the user’s browsing to a
global observer. If the script is located on the user’s machine, it would also disclose his IP to
the destination site, whereas if the script is not located atthe user’s machine, this behaviour
would be no different from that of a single-hop proxy.
1.7 Performance
The speed of browsing through a caching proxy as compared to the speed of browsing the
original website is dependent on a number of parameters, includi g the routes to the original
server and to the proxy, the bandwidth of the corresponding connections, and the speed of
accessing files in the cache.
To reduce the contribution of some of these factors, we chosepag s hosted by Google
itself for our study on the performance of Google cache. We ran tests downloading various
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From original server From cache server
Average page load time 0.525 sec 0.483 sec
Min page load time 0.280 sec 0.420 sec
Max page load time 0.930 sec 1.000 sec
Table 1.3: Download times, 12K page
From original server From cache server
Average page load time 0.478 sec 0.457 sec
Min page load time 0.320 sec 0.430 sec
Max page load time 0.770 sec 0.500 sec
Table 1.4: Download times, 16K page
pages hosted by googlepages.com directly from googlepages.com (Google-owned webpage
hosting) and from the Google cache. In all the cases, the performance penalty incurred by
accessing the cached version instead of the original was small enough to be unnoticeable to
a human.
The results of our experiments can be found in tables 1.4–1.7below. Page sizes varied
from apparently typical range of 10K–40K to the unusual 200K. Cached page versions were
about 2K larger than the originals, due to the extra header added by the Google proxy. It
should be noted that accesses to the cached page were slowed dn by redirects to the
caching server from google.com. Our testing scripts and more information on the choice
of target pages can be found athttp://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/ ∼ashubina/
googlepages.tgz .
The above tables for pages of different sizes are summarizedin Fig. 1.3. Notably,
cached page download times exhibited less variation than the respective original pages,
being served from a different groups of servers.
We conclude that, given a sufficiently powerful caching proxy, accessing a cached ver-
sion of a page instead of the original version does not have tocause a noticeable perfor-
mance hit.
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From original server From cache server
Average page load time 0.569 sec 0.533 sec
Min page load time 0.410 sec 0.460 sec
Max page load time 1.140 sec 1.040 sec
Table 1.5: Download times, 27K page
From original server From cache server
Average page load time 1.145 sec 1.254 sec
Min page load time 0.843 sec 0.913 sec
Max page load time 1.504 sec 1.425 sec
Table 1.6: Download times, 36K page
From original server From cache server
Average page load time 1.070 sec 1.473 sec
Min page load time 0.930 sec 1.000 sec
Max page load time 1.420 sec 4.310 sec
Table 1.7: Download times, 198K page
Figure 1.3: Download times for original and cache servers, by page size (KBytes)
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1.8 The caching proxy controversy
It appears to be an unfortunate law of the modern civilization hat whenever anyone wants
to give out something for free, someone else is going to have aproblem with it. Caching
proxies are no exception to this rule.
Most Web sites strive for high search engine rankings (on howto play this game, see, for
example, [CD03]). However, as described in a recentnews.com article [Ols03b], many
of them are unhappy with caching of their contents.
[Ols03b] gives the following list of complaints about search engine caching:
• Caching of removed data.Caching lets users access pages that are temporarily un-
available. Thus it sometimes provides also access to content that has been deliberately
taken off-line.
• Access to registration-only sites.Due to faults in the design of a number of sites
that require registration, caching may end up indexing and caching their content.
• Detouring traffic from the original sites. The very feature that we propose to use for
anonymity is a subject of such complaints. The claim is that by detouring traffic from
the sites where the original information is stored, cachingmay make Web publishers
lose their income.
Interestingly, for the current implementations of all the wb caches we reviewed ([Goo],
[Way], [Com], [Gig]), the last claim is not quite valid. Among the many ways in which the
user’s anonymity from the original site provided by the use of such caches is violated are
images, which usually include also ads. Since ads are not cached, a cached copy of a
webpage with an ad usually displays the ad downloaded from its or ginal provider. Such
ads may, however, not be able to track to which site they really owe this request very well,
and thus may mistake the web cache for the referrer. (However, th proxy we prototyped
has a different behaviour.)
Google’s response to the last complaint is that web sites caneasily prevent Google
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from caching their pages without preventing it from indexing them. All it takes is adding
to your page either<META NAME="ROBOTS" CONTENT="NOARCHIVE"> to exclude
all robots, or<META NAME="GOOGLEBOT" CONTENT="NOARCHIVE"> to exclude
just Google. However, some sites are reluctant to do this forfear that this may affect their
search rankings.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has a narrow exceptionfor Web caching, allow-
ing internet service providers to keep local copies of Web pages. It is not clear, however,
whether this would protect also search engine caches or archives similar to [Way] if tested.
The legality of a caching proxy such as we prototyped under thmodern copyright
laws is yet to be determined, as is the legality of search engin caches. Due to the very
features that make our scheme provide anonymity that are notthere for other web caches,
our scheme may not be ruled legal even if other web caches are.
1.9 Extensions
Obviously, a proxy such as we prototyped would not allow the us rs to use any dynamic
content. A user could not provide any information to be passed to the destination site
without informing the destination site and the global observer that someone is using the
proxy to look at the destination site. It might be possible todesign a proxy that submits
such a request for the user together with other people’s requests or a number of randomly
generated requests, but such an extension is bound to be subject to attacks.
However, a natural extension would be allowing to search Google cache, using Google
itself and rewriting the results to point back into the cache. It might also be possible to
design a caching proxy that provides thumbnail images, as doe Google.
Google (as well as the other caching proxies described above) d es not provide encryp-
tion, hence the information going to and from Google is not encrypted. An encrypted proxy
would allow protection from an attacker that can watch traffic going to it. Against such an
attacker, it would also help to bundle packets together or break them up, normalizing their
size. Such a proxy could also attempt to conceal its operations fr m an attacker at the very
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proxy by means of private information retrieval.
1.10 The future of caching proxies
In this chapter we presented an approach that would allow retrieving text information from
the web with better anonymity than a single-hop proxy allowsto achieve and would also
eliminate long-term correlation attacks by the global attacker. The approach uses a caching
proxy that contains its own copy of the World Wide Web (or of its large subset). One
example of such a proxy is Google cache, which we used for a prototype.
Our prototype is already useful both for achieving limited anonymity, and for accessing
cached copies of sites that for some reason are unaccessibleat the moment.
As privacy of web transactions becomes more and more important and harder and harder
to achieve, it may be worthwhile to use caching proxies to achieve anonymous access to




A coercion-resistant, voter verifiable
electronic voting system
The problem of producing a fair voting system is well-known and, as demonstrated, for
example, by the US presidential elections of 2000, not a simple one to solve. At the very
least, such a system should protect voters from coercion by adversaries; it is also highly
desirable, and not usually achieved in practice, that voters b able to verify that the tally
reflects the sum of the votes that were actually cast, as they were intended to be cast. Cur-
rently most proposed voting systems fall short in this regard: they either do not provide
both coercion-resistance and verifiability or require the voter to be a computer.
In the paper “Design and Prototype of a Coercion-Resistant,Voter Verifiable Electronic
Voting System” (A.M. Shubina and S.W. Smith, 2004) we discusthe requirements of a fair
voting system and propose a system that satisfies these requirements.
The following requirements are generally considered to be desirable for an electronic
voting system.
1. Correctness.Every voter should be able to vote but only once; only votes cast by
registered voters should be included in the tally; all votesshould be correctly counted.
2. Privacy. Nobody except the voter can find out what choices the voter made without
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interacting with the voter.
3. Receipt-freeness or coercion resistance.R ceipt-freeness means that the voter cannot
carry away any evidence of how he voted. The property of coerci n resistance is
stronger: it means that the voter should be able to cheat an adversary who may interact
with him and instruct him to vote in a given manner.
A desirable property is also that ofverifiability. Verifiability would allow the voter to
check that his vote was committed as intended and made it to the final tally as cast (voter
verifiability) and would also allow any observer to verify the tally (universal verifiability).
Intuitively, the property of voter verifiability appears tobe incompatible with the prop-
erty of receipt-freeness: if the voter is able to verify thatis vote was counted as he cast it,
what can prevent him from proving how he voted to a third party? This seeming incompat-
ibility has been addressed in literature by cryptographical means. The voter may be given
an encrypted copy of his vote and allowed to verify that his vote made it to the final tally.
However, this either requires the voter to be able to verify that he encryption is correct or
makes other sacrifices: for example, in case of Chaum’s layered receipts, the voter can be
cheated with probability 50%.
We produced an electronic voting scheme that sacrifices a cert in amount of privacy but
allows nearly perfect voter verifiability. Our scheme addresses the contradiction between
verifiability and receipt-freeness in the following manner: we rely on the information in the
voter’s head, known to be true to the voter but impossible to prove to be true to anybody
else. The idea is to allow the voter to carry away a receipt that is uninformative for a
coercer without access to the voting machine or to the contents of the cast ballots. The
receipt would point to a number of vote records in the centraldatabase, one of which, as
remembered by the voter, is the correct record of the voter’svote, whereas the others point at
different records. Our system does not assume any trust in the voting machine, but requires
a few other assumptions, which we believe to be reasonable inthe real-world situation.
A basic prototype of this system is available on our website at http://althing.cs.
dartmouth.edu/cgi-bin/electme2/master.pl.
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Section 2.2 briefly discusses the requirements for a secure election system. Section
2.3 presents a brief overview of methods used in receipt-free el ction schemes. Section
2.4 discusses the most recently implemented election schemes. Section 2.5 presents our
election scheme. Section 2.6 discusses the practical applic bility of our scheme. Section
2.7 describes our prototype. Section 2.8 offers some concluding remarks.
2.1 Solving the problem of fair elections
The US presidential elections of 2000 made the general public aware of the problems of
producing a voting system that could be trusted by the votersto submit their votes correctly.
Despite the public review and control of the US electoral system, many US citizens felt that
the system had failed them. Although the problems did not originate in the 2000 election,
the situation where a very small number of votes was sufficient to flip the final tally raised
the public’s awareness of the inadequacy of the system.
The problem of producing a fair voting system has been well-known in countries and
situations where adversaries have a very high degree of control. In totalitarian societies
(or other situations with almost complete adversarial control), it may be futile to attempt
to solve this problem. Such societies provide no guarantee that the adversary will comply
with the solution, no guarantee that the observers and complainants will be able to speak
up, and no guarantee that the situation will be corrected even if there is a valid complaint.
However, in a free democratic society in the 21st century, the electoral system is subject to
public review and control. Its failures do not have to be possible.
If an electronic voting system is to be applied in secret-ballot elections, it has to be
receipt-free, i.e. not allow a voter to carry away any evidence of who he voted for, since
such evidence would permit vote buying and coercion. Receipt-freeness is hard to combine
with voter verifiability: if a voter is able to verify that his vote was counted as he cast it,
what could prevent him from proving how he voted to a third party?
Cryptography can help address this seeming incompatibility between receipt-freeness
and voter verifiability, for example by allowing the voter tocarry away an encrypted copy of
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his vote and to verify that his encrypted vote made it to the final tally. However, that requires
the voter to be able to verify that the encryption of his vote is correct. Chaum’s layered
receipts [Cha04] (discussed below) solve this problem partially: they allow verification, but
only with probability 50%.
In this paper, we examine the desirable properties of electroni voting systems and
survey the principal current approaches to such systems. Wethen present a new design that
improves on the previous work, by being (arguably) the first one that achieves both voter
verifiability and coercion resistance, while not assuming the voter is a computer, not relying
on correct behavior by the voting machine, and detecting close t 100% of misbehaviour.
2.2 Requirements for an election system
The two basic properties commonly required of election system arecorrectnessandpri-
vacy. An election system should produce a correcttally—the result of the election. It should
also ensure that the participant’s vote will remainprivate(infeasible to find out without co-
operation with the voter)—although sacrificing the privacyrequirement permits making the
system much simpler.
The more interesting properties extensively studied in theoretical literature arereceipt-
freenessand coercion resistance(as described in Section 2.2.3) andverifiability (as de-
scribed in Section 2.2.4).
Would ensuring correctness, privacy, receipt-freeness, and verifiability be sufficient for
a real-world election system? Arguably, almost all problems in existing real-world election
systems stem from the lack of one of these properties. Less discussed, and not ensured by
any of these properties, is another important property:t ust.
2.2.1 Correctness
The very first requirements of every voting scheme are that every oter should be able to
vote, but only vote once; only votes cast by registered voters should be included in the final
tally; and all votes cast by registered voters should be corre tly counted.
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Defining a correct tally is somewhat harder, because it is unclear how to handle incor-
rectly cast votes. In the definitions of Benaloh and Tuinstra[BT94], a tally is correct if
correctly cast votes representing a valid choice are counted, whereas incorrectly cast votes
that do not represent a valid choice may be counted one way or another. It may be worth
noting that in a real-world situation it may be unacceptableto include incorrectly cast votes
into the tally, and thus the ability to distinguish incorrectly cast votes may be important.
Hirt and Sako [HS00] get around this problem by requiring forc rectness that no voter be
able to cast an invalid vote. Other possible approaches could be allowing to either discard
or correctly fix invalid votes.
2.2.2 Privacy
Privacy, in the context of elections, means ensuring that nobody except th voter can find
what choices the voter made without interacting with the votr. More precisely, an adversary
should not obtain more information about a voter’s vote thanprovided by the election tally.
Privacy of a voting system is dependent on assumptions as to what the adversary can or
cannot do and is often based on assertions about the adversary’s computational power.
One of the possible physical assumptions made for privacy isavoting booththat allows
the voter to secretly and interactively communicate with anauthority. A weaker assumption
is anuntappable channelthat allows a voter to send a message that cannot be observed
by the outsiders. Whereas voting booths are used for voting in the real world, they are
typically used only for communication with the voting machine and do not allow remote
communication.
2.2.3 Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance
The initial papers on secret-ballot elections considered th property ofreceipt-freeness. As
introduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra [BT94], receipt-freeness is the inability of a voter to
prove to an adversary how he voted, even if the voter would like to provide this proof.
Receipt-freeness is necessary in secret ballot elections.Indeed, if the voter had the ability
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to prove to an adversary the contents of his vote, the adversary would be able to demand
from the voter that he vote in a particular manner and reward him for voting in this manner
or penalize him for not complying with the demand.
More recently, Juels and Jakobsson [JJ] introduced a stronge notion ofcoercion resis-
tance. A coercion-resistant system is a system where the voter cancheat an adversary who
may interact with him and instruct him to vote in a given manner, but the adversary will not
be able to determine whether the voter behaved as instructed—even if the adversary asks
the voter to disclose his keys or to abstain from voting.
2.2.4 Verifiability
In the ideal voting scheme, the voter should be able to verifythat his vote was committed
as intended and made it into the final tally as cast (individual verifiability, or voter verifia-
bility), and any observer should be able to verify the tally (universal verifiability).
These two properties provideverifiability—the possibility of verification that all votes
are counted correctly.
2.2.5 Trust
The question of trust in a voting system is one of the most discus ed and least agreed
upon. Who should trust whom for what? Is it enough for an expert to trust another expert’s
assertion that the system functions correctly?
The range of opinions on what would constitute a trustworthyelectronic voting system
is very wide, ranging from Rebecca Mercuri’sStatement on Electronic Voting[Mer01] that
demands the use of “an indisputable paper ballot” and the Mercuri Method [Mer02], to
Andrew Neff’s [NA03] and David Chaum’s [Cha04] reliance on verification. There is, as
yet, no agreement on whether it would be sufficient to have a system that the experts can
prove sufficiently untamperable.
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2.3 Basic cryptographic schemes
The following cryptographic approaches for secure electronic voting have been widely dis-
cussed in literature.
2.3.1 Voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryptionis encryption over an algebraic group such that the encryption of
the sum of two elements of the group is the sum of the encryptions of these elements. The
idea of using homomorphic encryption in electronic voting is to sum the encrypted votes,
and then decrypt the sum—without decrypting individual votes.
The first homomorphic encryption voting scheme was proposedin the paper by Be-
naloh and Tuinstra [BT94]. This scheme was proven by Hirt andSako in [HS00] not to be
receipt-free. In the same paper Hirt and Sako proposed another, receipt-free, homomorphic
encryption voting scheme.
Homomorphic encryption schemes do not support write-in votes.
2.3.2 Voting schemes based on mix-nets
A number of electronic voting schemes are based on Chaum’smix-nets[Cha81]. Mix-nets
encrypt, permute, and re-encrypt the sequences of input elements, producing permutations
of these elements intended to conceal their original order.
In mix-net voting schemes, a vote is encrypted with a sequence of the keys of the au-
thorities and consequently decrypted by the authorities who prove the correctness of the
decryption. An example of such a receipt-free voting schemeis the scheme proposed by
Sako and Kilian in [SK95].
Mix-net based schemes can support write-in votes.
2.3.3 Voting schemes based on blind signatures
Blind signatures(also due to Chaum) allow an authority to sign an encrypted message
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without seeing its contents. In electronic voting schemes,blind signatures are used to allow
the administrator to authenticate a voter by signing an encrypted ballot.
An example of a scheme based on blind signatures is the schemeproposed by Okamoto
in [Oka96]. Okamoto later showed this scheme not to be receipt-free and fixed it in [Oka97].
Schemes based on blind signatures can support write-in votes.
2.3.4 Voting schemes based on ring signatures
Ring signatures, first introduced by Rivest et al. in [RST01], are signaturesthat do not allow
to determine the identity of the member of the group of signers who signed the message.
In e-voting applications, ring signatures are used to allowv ters to sign their votes without
leaking their identity. To avoid double voting,linkable ring signatures– signatures that
allow to determine whether two messages have been signed by the same signer – have been
used in [LWW04], [LW05], and [TW05].
2.4 Some notable election schemes
Recent literature also provides examples of practical, imple ented schemes.
2.4.1 David Chaum’s encrypted receipts
David Chaum’s new scheme [Cha04] allows a voter to walk away from the polling place
with an encrypted receipt that has previously been shown to him to correctly contain his
vote.
The scheme functions in the following way. The voter chooseshis votes electronically.
The voting machine prints out a two-layer image that displays the vote. The user selects
which part of the image—the top layer or the bottom layer—he would like to keep, and
walks away with it. The voter can later verify that the receipt was correctly posted on the
election site by looking it up by the receipt’s serial numberin the receipt batch, the set of
receipts the authority intends to count. Thetally batch, the set of plaintext images of ballots
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as seen in the voting booth, is also posted in random order, allowing everyone to verify the
tally.
On each ballot, the voting machine can cheat with probability 50% by either printing
one incorrect layer, or reusing the serial number, or performing a tally process step incor-
rectly. Thus, if even only 10 modified ballots are verified, the chances that the tampering
will go undetected would be less than 1 in 1000.
The scheme does not answer the question of what to do if the election did get tampered
with. Since only 50% modified ballots will be detected, thereis no opportunity to recast
only the modified ballots.
2.4.2 VoteHere
In an attempt at providing voter verification and ensuring user trust, the VoteHere [Vot] [NA03]
system hands a voter a paper receipt.
In the VoteHere scheme, a voter starts with avoting token(a smart card or a key). This
voting token can be inserted into a machine that lists all candidates and provides averifica-
tion codefor every candidate. The verification codes are different for every voting token.
The voter picks the codes corresponding to his choices and gets a r ceipt listing the ballot
number, these codes, and the signature of the ballot produced by the voting machine. Later,
the voter can use the ballot number to verify that the codes were recorded correctly; how-
ever, he cannot verify that the voting machine did not swap candidates before presenting to
him the codes. Instead, the voter should trust that the trustees responsible for the generation
of codebooks and auditing of the machines made this impossible.
2.4.3 Rivest’s ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin systems
ThreeBallot
In Rivest’s ThreeBallot system [Riv06] the ballot consistsof three ballots, which are origi-
nally identical except for their numbers. Each candidate has an empty circle corresponding
to him on every ballot. The voter is supposed to vote for a candidate by filling in 2 of the 3
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circles and against a candidate by filling in only 1 circle.
BALLOT BALLOT BALLOT
President President President
Alex Jones ◦ Alex Jones ◦ Alex Jones •
Bob Smith • Bob Smith • Bob Smith ◦
Carol Wu ◦ Carol Wu • Carol Wu ◦
Senator Senator Senator
Dave Yip • Dave Yip ◦ Dave Yip ◦
Ed Zinn ◦ Ed Zinn • Ed Zinn •
3147524 6808952 5593816
The checker machine verifies that the ballot is valid. The votr selects one of the three
parts of the ballot and carries away a copy of it. The three ballots are separated and sub-
mitted. All ballots get published, and each voter is able to verify that his receipt matches a
published ballot.
VAV
Proposed in [RS07], Rivest’s VAV (Vote / Anti-Vote / Vote) system also requires the voter
to fill out three ballots, two of which are marked “V” for Vote,and one is marked “A” for
Anti-Vote. The Anti-Vote ballot and one of the Vote ballots (as selected by the voter) negate
each other and must be identical except for the “A” and “V” indicators. VAV can support
any kind of voting system. In the example below, the VAV system is used in a ranking
scheme, and the last two ballots negate each other.
BALLOT BALLOT BALLOT
V A V
Alice 1 Alice 2 Alice 2
Bob 2 Bob 1 Bob 1
Mallory 3 Mallory 3 Mallory 3
5077332 9556124 3832472




The voting system called “Twin” was introduced by Rivest in [RS07]. In this scheme, the
voter fills out just one ballot, which has its number hidden under a scratch-off cover. The
scratch-off cover is removed after the ballot is submitted.The voter gets to take home a
copy of a random previously-cast ballot.
2.5 Our voter-verifiable election scheme
All of the above described voting schemes—both the theoretical ones and the implemented
ones—appear to allow receipt-free implementations. However, verifiability (and also cor-
rectness, in schemes relying on verifiability for correctness) turns out to be harder to achieve
in practice than in theory. Here are just a few problems with the schemes listed above.
VoteHere’s scheme depends for its correctness and verifiability on the correct behavior of
the voting machine. Chaum’s scheme detects voting machine misbehavior in only 50% of
votes. In Rivest’s ThreeBallot and VAV schemes, if one part of the ballot is tampered with,
the chance that the voter will find this out is only 1/3; also, a corrupt checker may allow
voters to overvote. In Rivest’s Twin scheme, a voter cannot verify his or her own ballot,
and therefore a small political party may feel that not enough of ballots of its members get
verified by its other members.
To make a step toward ensuring users’ trust, we would like to propose a scheme that
would allow a user to verify how he voted, not only that a vote in h s name made it to
the destination. Our scheme does not make any assumptions abut the correct behavior
of a voting machine and makes voting machine misbehavior detectable in almost 100%
cases, achieving correctness and voter verifiability at thecost of one not commonly made
assumption: that the initial process of generating ticketsleaks no information.
This goal is hard to achieve without sacrificing coercion resistance; indeed, if the voter
can verify how he voted, then what prevents him from proving to someone else how he
voted? We will attempt to solve this problem by taking into account voter knowledge—that
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is, information known to the voter but not accessible to the co r er.
In our scheme, we make an attempt to achieve voter trust by permitting a voter to verify
his vote by using a printed receipt to query the central authority for the record on a certain
key. However, in order to avoid coercion, the voter should possess also the keys corre-
sponding to his other possible votes and should be aware of this correspondence, perhaps
by having it recorded on the same printed receipt. Also, in order for this idea to work, the
voter’s choice should be specified by the voter in such a manner that no malicious authority
would be able to tamper with it without detection.
Our scheme provides the voter with pre-generated keys and allows him to permute
them, matching the keys with the possible votes. This permutation ensures that a malicious
authority cannot on its own generate a desired ballot. The permutation is also used to
provide a visually satisfying receipt and verification routine. The voter’s choice is specified
by submitting the key corresponding to the desired candidate. Finally, a signature of the
ballot is generated by the voting machine. This signature isprinted on the voter’s receipt
and publicly posted. The signature can be used by the trustedobservers to check that the
recorded ballot matches it.
2.5.1 Assumptions
In our scenario, we are trying to imitate the real-world model of electronic voting. We
assume that the world consists of:
• the central authorityA (in the real world, the central election committee);
• local authoritiesB1, . . . , Bm (in the real world, the voting machines);
• n votersV1, . . . ,Vn;
• only a finite numberd of possible choicesc1, . . . , cd for all votes.
(One of these possible choices should be “no selection”, to allow the voter to abstain from
voting. A few choices may be dummy votes.)
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We assume no communication by the central authority with thevot rs, but we assume
the existence of voting booths—that is, communication of voters with the voting machines.
This latter assumption does not appear to be unreasonable; voting booths are frequently
used in the real world for ensuring voters’ privacy.
Our scheme involves tickets generated by the central authority A. We require another
assumption: that no information leaks from the initial process of generating voting tickets
leaks to local authorities. One method of ensuring this assumption could be having different
authorities participate in generating keys on cards, so that no uthority would have the full
information.
2.5.2 Process
The steps necessary to cast a vote are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
• The central authorityA (or a set of authorities) uses its public-key encryption function
E to encrypt some numbers. (This encryption function should not allow an adversary
to guess the plaintext and then verify this guess by encrypting i . It would suffice, for
example, to use RSA encryption with OAEP ([BR94]) padding.)The authority uses
E to encrypt numbers 1, . . . ,n to serve as ticket identifiers. (We usen, so there will
be a distinct identifier for each voter.) The authority also encrypts numbers 1, . . . ,dn
to serve as keys printed on tickets. (We usedn, so there will be a distinct identifier
for each choice, for each ticket.)
For each ticketi , let us defineFi (k) = E(di + k) (that is, thekth key on thei th
ticket). The authority stores both the ticket identifiers and the keys.
• The central authorityA then prints outn tickets (but does not publicize their con-
tents). Ticketi consists of the ticket identifierE(i ) and keysFi (1), . . . , Fi (d). In the
real world the authority could either produce a number of sealed envelopes containing
these tickets, or make them obtainable from the official election website only.
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Figure 2.1: The voting process
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getting it from the election website).
• Suppose voterVj selected ticketi and wishes to vote for choicecv (for somev with
1 ≤ v ≤ d). ThenVj casts to his local authorityBk a ballot consisting of
– ticket identifierE(i );
– a random permutationπ of 1, . . . ,d;
– Fi (πv). (Recall thatv is the index associated with voter’s choicecv .)
• The local authorityBk prints out a receipt including ticket numberi , all pairs(πm, cm)
(ordered byπm) and the signature of the ballot, as shown in Table 2.1.Bk hands the
receipt to the voter.
• Bk encrypts the ballot and signature with the public key of the central authority and
submits this to the central authorityA.
• When the central authorityA receives this ballot, it checks that it is properly formatted—
and that the key (allegedlyFi (πv)) really does decrypt to the index of a valid choice
cv . The authorityA also verifies that the signature provided is valid for this ballot. If
both these conditions are satisfied, the authorityA records this ballot as a vote forcv .
Within the ballot, the only information about the voter’s selection is Fi (πv), the key
corresponding to the permuted index of the voter’s real vote. The central authorityA can
decode it and findπv , thus finding the real vote (unless corrupted by the local authority).
However, by the assumptions of cryptography, the local authority cannot extractπv from
the key, and thus cannot find out who the voter voted for (unless the central authorityA
cheats).
Note also that the voter does not submit keysFi (t) for t 6= v . Thus if the central
authority did not share information with the local authority, the local authority cannot know
what these keys are.
If the local authority does not know the other keys on the ticket, it cannot manufacture
a ticket that features the votes in the same order but with an incorrect vote matched to a real
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key. The local authority can attempt to record a different vote under a correct key or corrupt
the correct key, but this attempt will later be caught by the verification process.
After the election is done, the central authorityA publishes the receipt signatures, thus
allowing any voter to verify that his ballot made it to the final count. For additional assur-
ance, the authorityA can provide a post-election query service: a voter can submit any key
Fi (π t) (and the ticket identifierE(i )), and check that he gets backt as shown. Figure 2.2
shows this process. If he sees that his vote did not make it as intended, he can request
resubmission.
2.5.3 Properties
The ability to look a vote up by the corresponding key allows voter verification. Indeed,
suppose looking up all keys on the ticket matches the votes submitted by the voter under
the corresponding indices. This could only be achieved in three ways.
1. The real vote is submitted correctly.
2. The local authority submitted a fake vote as a real vote. However, this would require
that the local authority know a key different than the one thevot r submitted. Since
the local authority does not know any of the other keys printed on the voter’s ticket, it












key Fi (π t)
cand
idatect
Figure 2.2: The verification process, for voterVj with ticket E(i ). In (A), a voter checks
that his ballot made it; in (B), a voter checks that the ballotthat made it in matches his
ticket.
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3. The central authority considers a fake vote to be a real vote. However, the signatures
are published and can be checked by voters, and trusted parties could verify that the
decryptions of the encrypted votes contain signatures matching these records.
Therefore, if the local authority does not have any prior knowledge of the keys, neither the
local nor the central authority can tamper with the voter’s choi e without detection. Thus
the voter can verify whether his vote is submitted correctly.
As mentioned above, the central authority cannot lie about the contents of the ballots it
got, because signatures will be posted and can be checked by voters, whereas the fact that
the decryptions got correctly counted may be verified by trusted parties.
If an external adversary who does not have access to the voting machine or to the central
authority’s data instructs a voter to behave in a certain manner, the only evidence of the
voter’s behavior will be his receipt (unless, as mentioned above, the ballots are disclosed).
However, even if the adversary’s choices show on the receiptas requested, any of them can
be the voter’s real choice.
Theorem 2.5.1.Our scheme protects against all of the following.
• Loss of votes. The presence of a vote can be verified by the voter if th signatures on
the ballots do not collide.
• Casting of an incorrect undetected vote by a voting machine.The probability that a
local authority will be able to manufacture a fake ballot is equal to the probability to
guess an encryption of the fake vote.
• Coercion by an adversary that does not have access to the voting machine or the
central authority. The receipt bears no information about the actual vote; any voter-
controlled parts of the receipt can be selected to match the coercer’s request without
affecting the voter’s choice of candidate.
• Tampering with the tally by an adversary that did not have access to the voting ma-
chines during the election. The ballots are signed by the voting machines; the prob-
ability of malfunction is the probability of collision of the signatures.
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2.5.4 Vulnerabilities
Our scheme is vulnerable in the following respects.
• If the central authority shares the keys with the local authori ies before the election,
this would allow the local authorities to corrupt ballots without detection.
• If ballots are disclosed, the property of coercion resistance would be lost.
• The central authority can check ballots and post signaturesin accordance with the
rules, but lie about the tally. Only trusted observers will be able to verify the tally.
2.6 Practical applicability
To cast one vote, the voters will have to submit two long numbers (the ticket identifier and
the encrypted index of the real vote) and some short numbers.To avoid this in practice, a
ticket could contain subtickets that can be scanned by the machine, containing these long
numbers. Alternatively, the vote could be cast electronically ( s in the prototype described
in the next section).
To simplify the voter’s interaction with the voting machine, the permutation of votes
could be randomly generated by the machine for the voter. However, allowing this to happen
would give the voting machine some control over the contentsof he ballot.
Another usability problem is due to the fact that the voter should submit only one key.
If the voter changes his mind after submitting this key, he will not be able to change his
choice without either leaking information or drawing another ticket.
Finally, in a real election more than one vote usually has to be cast, and more than one
ticket will have to be used.
2.7 Prototype
We created a prototype for this scheme. The prototype imitates user interaction with the
remote authority and with the local voting machine. It is currently accessible atalthing.
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dartmouth.edu/cgi-bin/electme2/master.pl.
The interaction proceeds as follows.
• First, the user opens two browser processes: one simulatingthe remote authority,
another simulating the local voting machine.
• The user requests initialization of the election from the remote authority. The remote
authority generates keys and tickets.
• The user selects a random ticket. The remote authority marksthe ticket as taken.
• The user submits the ticket ID to the local voting machine. (Se Figure 2.3.)
• The local voting machine prompts the user for a permutation of the indices on the
ticket corresponding to the placement of the votes (“customization of the ballot”).
(See Figure 2.4.)
• The local voting machine then lets the user vote. (See Figure2.5.)
• The local voting machine generates the receipt consisting of the ticket ID and the
indices, and of the signature (the encryption of the hash of the message with the
public key of the central authority).
• The local voting machine submits the encryption of the ballot nd the signature to the
central authority.
• The user can go to the website of the central authority and enter the keys listed under
the indices submitted. If the keys have his receipt’s vote choices listed under them,
he either gets the vote listed back (e.g., Figure 2.6), or knows that his vote did not get
submitted correctly (e.g., Figure 2.7).
2.8 Summary of properties of our system
We believe that in real-world situations, our scheme may work t allow voter verification
without making the voter susceptible to coercion more than he already is. (For example,
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in the real-world situation the voter may be coerced not to goto the polling place.) The
scheme achieves these results by allowing the use of voter knowledge that cannot be used
by a hypothetic coercer.
Our scheme takes the possible malfunctioning of or malicious interference with vot-
ing machines and loss of votes out of consideration, by replacing it with later verification.
Whereas the correctness of VoteHere’s scheme depends on theinitial step of generation of
codebooks and on verification that all voting machines functio as intended (which may
not be a trivial task), the correctness of our scheme dependso ly on the secrecy of data
distributed before the election. Every voter’s vote can be modified only with a small prob-
ability, ensuring that if the tampering is detected the votes can be cast again.
Our scheme hands out a readable receipt that allows the voterto s e that his vote got
cast as intended if the initial conditions of secrecy were met. We believe that this may help
with achieving voter trust in the system.
Our scheme is vulnerable if the central authority cheats before the election by cooper-
ating with the local authorities, and if a sufficient audit process is not feasible to verify the
tally after the election.
Our scheme is also vulnerable to hypothetical post-election disclosures of ballots. It
may be possible to address this issue by providing an extra layer of encryption between the
user and the voting machine, at the cost to usability. However, w do not believe that this is
likely to be a problem in a situation without a strong adversary.
In future work, we plan to address these shortcomings, as well as carry out pilots with
real users, and examine the usability of the various ways of ahuman user might communi-
cate the keys to the voting machine.
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Figure 2.3: The voter submits the ticket to the voting machine
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Figure 2.4: The voting machine responds with a prompt for thepermutation
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Figure 2.5: The voter casts his vote
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Figure 2.6: The voter checks that a ballot matching his tickehas been cast
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Figure 2.7: The voter submits an invalid key
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Chapter 3
Nearly Private Information Retrieval
A private information retrieval scheme is a protocol whereby a client obtains a record from
a database without the database operators learning anything about which record the client
requested. The client’s request thus remains totally private, uninformative both to the oper-
ators of the database and to any external observers. Privateinformation retrieval schemes
are well studied in the theoretical computer science literature.
As opposed to the schemes where the client is not concerned about the operators find-
ing out which record he requested, private information schemes require a relatively large
number of bits to be transmitted in order to hide the client’sreal intent. This limits the prac-
tical applicability of such schemes. Consequently, the main question answered in private
information retrieval literature is the question of the amount of communication required in
such protocols.
In the real world situations, the requirement of total privacy is frequently excessive. If
only a small number of requests to a large database is made, itmay be acceptable to allow
leaking some information about the record requested. In extreme cases, the user sometimes
may not even be so much concerned with privacy as with plausible deniability, with the
impossibility to prove that a certain request was made.
In this chapter we study a generalization of the private information retrieval concept to
nearly private information retrieval: to protocols that allow a small amount of information
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about the client’s intent to be leaked.
Despite having relaxed the privacy requirement, we were ablto prove three fairly
strong lower bounds on amounts of communication in nearly private information retrieval
schemes, for various parameter settings. These bounds extend pr viously known lower
bounds in the traditional setting of perfect privacy and, inone case, improve upon the pre-
vious best result that handled imperfect privacy.
3.1 Private information retrieval
Private information retrieval (PIR) schemes have been a substantial focus of theoretical
research in computer science, beginning with the highly influential work of Chor, Goldre-
ich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [CGKS98]. In that paper, as in most subsequent work, a PIR
scheme has been used to mean a communication protocol that specifies an interaction be-
tween aclient or userand one or moreservers. The user wishes to obtain a record from the
database without the servers learning anything about whichre ord the user seeks.
This problem stems from the same source as the problem of anonymous communica-
tion over the internet discussed in Chapter 1. A user may havemany legitimate reasons to
conceal the details of his request for information. Examples of searches for sensitive in-
formation include medical data, lookups in patent databases, requests of stock market data,
and various searches necessitated by intelligence gathering.
It is worth noting that the practical applicability of PIR schemes has been discussed in
literature. In particular, in [SC07], Radu Sion et al argue that any non-trivial single-server
PIR protocol on real hardware is less efficient than transmitting he entire database.
A clean and concrete version of this problem, as proposed by Chor et al., is as follows:
the databasey is a string ofn bits. The client has an indexj ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} and she wishes
to obtain thej th bit of y, without the servers learning any information aboutj . As shown by
Chor et al., this strong privacy requirement means that if there is only one server that holds
the database, the trivial protocol in which the client simply downloads the entire database
is optimal in terms of the number of bits communicated. However, as shown in the same
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paper, if one allows the database to be replicated and copiesheld by two or more servers
that do not talk to each other, the problem can be solved usingsublinear communication.
Almost all past work on PIR schemes has required that the servers learnzeroinforma-
tion about the client’s indexj . Here, we ask the question: what happens if we allow the
protocol to leak a small amount of information aboutj ? To the best of our knowledge, the
only other work to have considered this question is that of Goldreich, Karloff, Schulman and
Trevisan [GKST02]. It isa priori conceivable that relaxing the privacy requirement might
decrease the communication required in PIR protocols. However, in this work, we prove
three lower bounds that show that previously known lower bounds for traditional (perfect
privacy) PIR protocols extend to this relaxed setting, up toconstant factor losses. One of
our bounds improves an earlier result of Goldreich et al. from the aforementioned paper.
We also show that another of our bounds is essentially optimal by exhibiting an appropriate
upper bound.
To explain our results in detail and compare them to previously known results, we begin
with some necessarily definitions.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
Notation
We begin by introducing some notation.
We denote [n] to be the set{1,2, . . . ,n}.
For random variablesX andY that take values in the same setS, we write X ≈δ Y to
mean that theL1 distance between the distributions ofX andY is at mostδ. To be precise,
∑
a∈S
| Pr[X = a] − Pr[Y = a]| ≤ δ .
Definition Let s, ℓq, ℓa be positive integers andε, δ be reals in [0,1]. An 1-rounds-server
(ℓq, ℓa; ε, δ)-PIR protocolP is a communication protocol between a single client, which
holds an indexj ∈ [n] ands servers, each of which holds a stringy ∈ {0,1}n. Formally,P
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is specified by the following set of functions.
• Query functionsQi : [n]×{0,1}ρ −→ {0,1}ℓq , from the user to serversS1, S2, . . . , Sk
where the input ofQ j is the indexi and a random input of lengthm, and the output
of Q j is the query string that the user should send to serverSj .
• Answer functions Ansi : {0,1}n × {0,1}ℓq −→ {0,1}ℓa that compute the string to be
returned to the user by serverj from the database and from the user’s query.
• Recovery function Rec : [n] × {0,1}ρ × [{0,1}ℓa]k −→ {0,1} that computes thei th
bit of the database fromi , the user’s randomness, and the answers of the servers to
the user’s queries.
For compactness of notation, we shall drop the subscript onQi and Ansi altogether
when s = 1. The protocol operates as follows: the client generates a random stringR
distributed uniformly in{0,1}ρ and, for eachi ∈ [n], sends aquery string Qi ( j , R) to
serveri . Upon receiving a query stringz, serveri sends ananswerstring Ansi (y, z) to the
client. The client then outputs arecovered bit
Out( j , y, R) := Rec( j , R,Ans1(y,Q1( j , R)), . . . ,Anss(y,Qs( j , R)))
which is the client’s guess at the value ofy j . The protocol must satisfy the following two
conditions.
Correctness: ∀ j ∈ [n], y ∈ {0,1}n : PrR[Out( j , y, R) = y j ] ≥ 1 − ε.
Privacy: ∀ i ∈ [s], j , k ∈ [n] : Qi ( j1, R) ≈δ Qi ( j2, R).
The parameterq is called thequery length, a theanswer length, ε the recovery error, and
δ the privacy parameterof the protocolP. The communication cost ofP is cost(P) =
s(ℓq + ℓa), the total number of bits communicated. Since we only deal with constant values
of s, there is no asymptotic loss in requiring that all servers receive queries of the same
length and return answers of the same length. The goal in designing PIR protocols is to
simultaneously reduceε, δ, and cost(P).
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Whenε = 0, the protocol is said to haveperfect recoveryand whenδ = 0, it is said to
haveperfect privacy. The bulk of theoretical research on PIR has focused on the cas ε =
δ = 0. The work of Goldreich et al. [GKST02] and that of Kerenidisand de Wolf [KdW03]
did consider theε > 0 case. However, relatively little attention has been paid to theδ > 0
case, except for one result of Goldreich et al. mentioned below.
Whens = 1, we shall drop the first arguments of the functionsQ and Ans. Thus, we
will have Q : [n] × {0,1}ρ → {0,1}q and Ans :{0,1}n × {0,1}q → {0,1}a.
Quantum systems
An in-depth explanation of quantum computation can be found, for example, in [NC00].
We present the basics here, in order to be able to follow and extend the quantum argument
of Kerenidis and de Wolf in [KdW03].
A qubit |φ〉 is a vector of unit length in a 2-dimensional complex vector space with a
standard basis, the vectors of which are denoted by|0〉 and|1〉. Namely,
|φ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉,
whereα andβ are calledamplitudes, and|α|2 + |β|2 = 1.
The qubit|φ〉 can bemeasuredin an orthonormal basis. If we measure it in the standard
basis, the result of this measurement will be either|0〉 with probability |α|2 or |1〉 with
probability |β|2.
We will consider alsom-qubit states, which are unit vectors in a tensor product ofm
2-dimensional vector spaces such as described above. Such vectors can be denoted by
|b1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |bm〉, |b1〉 . . . |bm〉, or |b1 . . . bm〉, whereb1, . . . ,bm ∈ {0,1}. The inner product
of two such states|φ〉 and|ψ〉 is denoted by〈φ|ψ〉 and defined in the ordinary Euclidean
sense. Two states are said to be orthogonal if their inner product is 0. Anm-qubit state|φ〉
can also be measured in an orthonormal basis of|ψ1〉, . . . , |ψn〉, giving the outcome of|ψi 〉
with the probability〈ψi |φ〉2. If the outcome is|ψi 〉, the state will then collapse to the state
|ψi 〉.
48
Kerenidis and de Wolf considerquantum queries. A quantum query to a stringx can be
defined as a transformation
|c〉|i 〉 7→ (−1)c·xi |c〉|i 〉,
wherec is called acontrol bit, because it specifies whether or not the phase(−1)xi is added
to the vector.
Locally decodable codes
Definition We call an encodingC : {0,1}n −→ {0,1}m a (q, δ, ǫ)-locally decodable code
(or LDC) if there exists a randomized decoding algorithm that queries the codeword non-
adaptively at mostq times and decodes each separate bit correctly with probability ≥ 1− ǫ
if the encoding is corrupted in no more thanδm bits.
Such an encoding is called a(q, δ, ǫ)-locally quantum-decodable code (LQDC)if the
algorithm is allowed to be a quantum computer and to make queries in superposition.
3.1.2 Previous work
In the 2-server case, it is known thatO(n1/3) communication can be achieved, even with
ε = δ = 0, via a number of different schemes; see, e.g., Chor et al. [CGKS98], Beimel,
Ishai and Malkin [BIM00], and Woodruff and Yekhanin [WY05].No strong general lower
bound is known that comes close to matching this upper bound.However, a recent result
of Razborov and Yekhanin [RY06] provides an(n1/3) bound for protocols whose com-
putation is restricted in a certain way (bilinear group based protocols, which include all
known 2-server protocols). With arbitrary computations allowed, thereare strong lower
bounds known provided the answer lengthℓa is short. The cleanest of these results are for
the ℓa = 1 case. In this case, Kerenidis and de Wolf [KdW03] prove a lower bound of
(1− H (11/14− 4ε/7))n − 2 whenδ = 0. Beigel, Fortnow and Gasarch [BFG06] prove a
tight n − 2 lower bound whenε = δ = 0.
A lower bound handling positiveε andδ was proven for 2-server case by Goldreich et
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al. [GKST02]. Their bound, forℓa = 1, is (1 − 2ε − δ)n/24− 4. (Note that our use ofε
andδ is different from theirs; we have translated their bound into our notation.)
It is worth noting that the issue of lower bounds for PIR schemes with 3 or more servers
has recently been largely settled, in a most dramatic way, byYekhanin [Yek07]. Yekhanin
proved that if there are an infinite number of Mersenne primes, then for infinitely manyn
there is anO(n1/ log logn) 3-server PIR protocol.
Computationally bounded private information retrieval
The above results refer to traditional PIR that assumes no bounds on computational power
of the database servers. PIR schemes with databases that have computational limits have
also been considered in the literature. Number theoretic conje tures and one-way functions
have been used to achieve PIR schemes with communication that, in some cases, beat the
known upper bounds, and in other beat the known lower bounds.I particular, Kushilevitz
and Ostrovsky used the hardness of the Quadratic Residue Problem in [KO97] and one-way
trapdoor permutations in [KO00], whereas Stern [Ste98] andMann [Man98] used homo-
morphic encryption to generate 1-database PIR schemes withO(nǫ) communication, where
ǫ can be arbitrarily small. In [CG97], Chor and Gilboa used one-way functions to construct
2-database schemes withO(nǫ) communication. This thesis does not study computation-
ally limited PIR.
3.1.3 Our results
We prove three lower bounds that allowδ > 0. Let P be a 1-server(ℓq, ℓa; ε, δ)-PIR
protocol. With the privacy requirement relaxed, even the 1-server case becomes nontrivial
and it is nota priori clear that sublinear communication PIR is not possible. However, we
show that forε = 0, we must have
cost(P) ≥ (1 − δ/2)n = (n).
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We also show, via an upper bound, that this dependence toδ is essentially tight, up to terms
quadratic inδ.
We also consider the more general case when bothε andδ can be nonzero. In this case,
we show that cost(P) ≥ (1 − H (ε + δ/2))n for sufficiently smallε and δ. Here H is
the binary entropy function given byH (x) := −x lg x − (1 − x) lg(1 − x); “lg” denotes
logarithm to the base 2.
Finally, we consider 2-server nearly private information retrieval schemes. Here, we
prove a lower bound of(1− H (3/4+2δ/3−
√
2δ− ε))n−2 whenℓa = 1, for sufficiently
small positiveε andδ. To see that our bound is an improvement over the bound of Goldreich
and co, consider the limiting caseε → 0, δ → 0: our lower bound then approaches 0.19n−
2, whereas the bound of [GKST02] approaches 0.04n − 4.
3.2 Upper bounds
Here we show simple improvements to the known upper bounds onthe communication
cost of PIR schemes by allowing imperfect privacy. As we shall see later, the 1-server
upper bound we obtain below is essentially optimal in the perfect recovery case.
In the perfectly private case, the obvious upper bound isn bits, achieved, for example,
when the user sends no bits at all and downloads the whole database to guarantee his privacy.
This bound is equal to the lower bound proven in the original PIR paper [CGKS95]. Below
we show how to beat this bound in the nearly private case.
Theorem 3.2.1. For any δ > 0, there is a PIR protocol with perfect recovery, privacy
parameterδ and communication cost at most⌈lg n⌉ + ⌈(1 − δ/(2 + δ))n⌉ = (1 − δ/2 +
O(δ2))n + O(logn).
Proof. Let δ′ = δ/(2 + δ). For each integerj ∈ [n], define the sets
Sj := {k ∈ [n] : 0 ≤ (k − j ) modn ≤ (1 − δ′)n} ,
Tj := {k ∈ [n] : 0 ≤ ( j − k) modn ≤ (1 − δ′)n} .
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Design the functionQ so that, whenR is a uniform random string,Q( j , R) is uniformly
distributed onSj . For k ∈ [n] and y ∈ {0,1}n, let Ans(y, k) return the concatenation, in
some canonical order, of ally j such thatj ∈ Tk. It is easy to see thatk ∈ Sj ⇔ j ∈ Tk;
therefore Ans(y,Q( j , R)) is guaranteed to contain the desired bity j and we can design
Rec so as to recovery j from Q( j , R) and Ans(y,Q( j , R)). Clearly, the PIR protocol given
by (Q,Ans,Rec) has perfect recovery and communication cost at most⌈lg n⌉ + |Tk| ≤
⌈lg n⌉ + ⌈(1 − δ′)n⌉.
For all j ∈ [n], we have|Sj | ≥ (1 − δ′)n and fori 6= j , we have|Si \ Sj | + |Sj \ Si | ≤
2 · |[n] \ Sj | ≤ 2δ′n. Therefore, we can bound the protocol’s privacy parameter as follows:




A 2-server upper bound. In a similar manner to the 1-server case, it is possible to adda
δ-dependent coefficient to theO(n1/3) upper bound for 2-server PIR. The idea is to suitably
modify the covering codes scheme of Chor et al. [CGKS98].
In [CGKS95], the covering codes scheme for 2 servers is described in the following
way.
Associate the database with a 3-dimensional cube so that each side of the cube is of
length 3
√
n, and thei th element is ati1, i2, i3. Consider, for the moment, 23 servers cor-
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x j1, j2, j3.
The user can then reconstruct thexi1,i2,i3 by taking an exclusive-or of all responses. Chor et
al. useS000 and S111 to emulate serversS001, S010, S100 andS011, S110, S101 respectively in
the following way. To emulateS100, for example, the serverS000 sends all the3
√
n responses
corresponding to all the possibilities fori1; the other servers would be emulated similarly.
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Thus, each ofS000 andS111 will send 1 bit for itself and3
√
n bits for each of the 3 emulated
servers, for the total of 2+ 6 3
√











3 to S111 for the total of 6
3
√
n bits; thus the total is 2+ 12 3
√
n.
Extending our scheme from the previous section, all we need to do is select a subcube
containing(1 − δ′)n indices and guaranteed to contain the index that we are interested in.
We select it by having the user send logn bits to the 2 servers and then proceed with the
previous scheme, for the total of 2+ 2 logn + 12 3
√
(1 − δ′)n communication.
3.3 1-Server lower bounds
3.3.1 Perfect privacy and recovery
Chor et al. [CGKS98] prove that, in the 1-server case with perfect privacy,n bits must be
exchanged. Their argument goes as follows. A communicationC (the string of exchanged
bits) is said to bepossiblefor (y, j ) if there is a positive probability forC to happen when
the database isy, and the user tries to obtain thej th bit. C is said to bepossiblefor j if
it is possible for some pair(y, i ). Let us fix a j and assume that the number of possible
communications forj is less than 2n. Then there exist different databasesy, y′ andC such
that C is possible for both(y, j ) and (y′, j ). But by the privacy requirement, for every
k ∈ [n], C must also be possible for(y, k) and (y′, k), since the queries are distributed
equally, and the responses are determined by the queries. Pick an ndexj such thaty j 6= y′j .
We know thatC is possible for both(y, j ) and(y′, j ), but C determines the output of the
protocol, thus the protocol must yield the same bit, and we get a contradiction.
This argument fails in the nearly private case, since there is no requirement that the
same communication be possible for all indices if it is possible for one. However, we can
still obtain strong lower bounds, as we will show below.
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3.3.2 Plausible deniability
As mentioned before, the requirement of perfect privacy is very strong and generally unnec-
essary in the real world, where people may be concerned more with plausible deniability
than with perfect privacy.
More specifically, instead of saying that for all indices thedistributions of possible
communications must be the same, in the real world it may be sufficient to settle for the
same set of communications being possible for every index.
The argument of Chor et al. [CGKS98], as described in the previous section, goes
through for this case without any changes, since it only requi s the same set of com-
munications being possible for every index and makes no use of the requirement that these
communications be equally distributed for every index. It turns out thatn bits of communi-
cation is required merely to provide plausible deniability.
3.3.3 Nearly private schemes with perfect recovery
Theorem 3.3.1.LetP be a1-server(ℓq, ℓa; 0, δ)-PIR protocol, whereδ > 0. Thenℓa ≥
(1 − δ/2)n. In particular,cost(P) ≥ (1 − δ/2)n.
Proof. For an indexj ∈ [n] and a queryz ∈ {0,1}q, let p j z = PrR[Q( j , R) = z]. Let
Jz = {j : p j z > 0}. If p j z > 0, y j must be recoverable from the response to queryz, hence
Jz is greater or equal the number of database elements that should be recoverable from the
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where the final inequality follows from the privacy guarantee ofP. Since
∑
z∈{0,1}q p1z = 1,
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this means that there exists az ∈ {0,1}q such that|Jz| ≥ (1 − δ/2)n. Fix such az.
Supposeℓa < |Jz|. Let Y := {y ∈ {0,1}n : y j = 0 for j /∈ Jz}. Then|Y| = 2|Jz|. The
string Ans(y, z) has lengthℓa, therefore it lies in a set of size 2ℓa < 2|Jz|. By the pigeonhole
principle, there exist distinct stringsy, y′ ∈ Y such that Ans(y, z) = Ans(y′, z). Let j be
an index such thaty j 6= y′j . Then j ∈ Jz. Therefore,p j z > 0, i.e., there exists anR such
that Q( j , R) = z. SinceP has perfect recovery, for thisR we must have
y j = Rec( j , R,Ans(y, z)) = Rec( j , R,Ans(y′, z)) = y′j ,
which is a contradiction. This proves thatℓa ≥ |Jz| ≥ (1 − δ/2)n.
3.3.4 Nearly private schemes with imperfect recovery
We now turn to the imperfect recovery case. We prove our lowerbound for this case by a
reduction from a communication problem with a well known lower bound. Later, we use a
much more sophisticated version of the same idea for a 2-server lower bound.
The problemINDEXn is a communication problem involving two players: Alice, who
holds ann-bit string x = x1x2 . . . xn (with eachx j ∈ {0,1}) and Bob, who holds an index
j ∈ [n]. A one-way communication protocol for this problem operats as follows: Alice
sends Bob a message based onx after which Bob outputs his guess at the bitx j . Both
players may use a public random string in making their decisions, i.e., the protocol is al-
lowed to be public coin. Ablayev [Abl96] proved the following sharp lower bound on the
communication cost of such a protocol.
Fact 3.3.2. Any public coin one-way communication protocol forINDEXn with error at
mostε must communicate at least(1 − H (ε))n bits.
Theorem 3.3.3. Let ε and δ be positive reals withε + δ/2 < 1/2. Then any1-server
(ℓq, ℓa; ε, δ)-PIR protocol hasℓa ≥ (1 − H (ε + δ/2))n. In particular, the communication
cost of such a protocol is at least(1 − H (ε + δ/2))n.
Proof. SupposeP is a 1-server(ℓq, ℓa; ε, δ)-PIR protocol that usesρ bits of randomness.
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Let D j z denote the conditional distribution ofR given thatQ( j , R) = z and let Gen :
[n] ×{0,1}ℓq ×{0,1}ρ′ → {0,1}ρ be such that Gen( j , z, R′) is distributed according toD j z
whenR′ is distributed uniformly in{0,1}ρ′ . Further, definef : [n] × {0,1}n × {0,1}ℓq ×
{0,1}ρ′ → {0,1} as follows.






0 , if Rec( j ,Gen( j , z, r ′),Ans(y, z)) = y j ,
1 , otherwise.
The correctness condition forP implies









Rec( j , R,Ans(y,Q( j , R))) 6= y j
]
≤ ε .
Now, using the privacy conditionQ( j , R) ≈δ Q(1, R) and the fact thatR and R′ are
independent, we have
ER,R′ [ f ( j , y,Q(1, R), R




In other words, the following is a public coin one-way communication protocol for the prob-
lem INDEXn, with error at mostε+δ/2. Alice and Bob share a pair of random strings(R, R′)
distributed uniformly in{0,1}ρ × {0,1}ρ′ . Alice, upon receivingy, sends Bob the message
µ := Ans(y,Q(1, R)). Bob, upon receivingj andµ, outputs Rec( j ,Gen( j ,Q(1, R), R′), µ)
as his guess aty j . Clearly, this protocol has cost at mostℓa. By Fact 3.3.2, we have
ℓa ≥ (1 − H (ε + δ/2))n, which completes the proof.
3.4 2-Server lower bounds
We now turn to the case of 2-server PIR protocols. As mentioned earlier, significantly
less is known about lower bounds for such protocols. In particular, the only strong lower
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bounds known for protocols that may make arbitrary computations are when the answer
size is restricted to be quite small. In particular, there are st ong results known for the case
of one-bit answers.
3.4.1 Prior work on perfectly private schemes
According to Gasarch’s survey [Gas04], the following lowerbounds exist for the 2-server
case.
1. If only linear answers of lengtha are allowed, then the user must send a query of
length( n2n ). This result is due to Goldreich et al. ([GKST02]).
2. If only linear queries are allowed, and each database returns 1 bit, then the database
must get a query of length at leastn − 1. This is due to Chor et al. ([CGKS95]).
3. A quantum argument by Kerenidis and de Wolf in [KdW03] shows that if the user
uses onlya of the bits sent back, then he must send a query of at least(n/26a). In
the case of 1-bit answers and recovery probability of 1/2+ δ the length of the queries
has to be at least(1 − H (1/2 + 4δ/7))n − 2.
4. In [BFG06] Beigel et al. have proven that in the case of answer of length 1 the
queries have to be of length at leastn − 2.
5. The last bound has been published in [RY06] after Gasarch’s survey and is due to
Razborov and Yekhanin. This bound is(n1/e) in case of bilinear schemes. This
bound shows that theO(n1/3) upper bound of the currently known protocols is opti-
mal at least for the bilinear case. The paper claims also thatall existing 2-server PIR
schemes are bilinear-based; the authors prove this claim for some of the schemes.
We shall show an asymptotically optimal lower bound extending the Kerenidis and de
Wolf [KdW03] result for the case of one-bit answers to the case of imperfect privacy.
Our proof uses aquantum computationframework first used by Kerenidis and de Wolf [KdW03].
Below, we quickly review their framework and argument and then show how to extend it to
allow imperfect privacy.
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3.4.2 The perfectly private1-bit case
Kerenidis and de Wolf prove a number of communication lower bounds for 2-server PIR
schemes. However, their arguments only handle the perfect privacy case, although they do
handle imperfect recovery. Their arguments are cast in a quantum communication frame-
work, the key observation of which can be expressed thus: “a single quantum query can
simulate two classical queries.” More precisely, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.4.1. (Kerenidis & de Wolf) Given a classical2-server PIR scheme with t-bit
queries,1-bit answers, and recovery probability1/2 + δ, it is possible to produce a quan-
tum1-server PIR scheme with(t + 2)-qubit queries,(t + 2)-qubit answers, and recovery
probability 1/2 + 4δ/7.
Using this observation, Kerenidis and de Wolf build from a 2-server PIR scheme a 1-
server quantum PIR scheme, generate a random access code, and then prove lower bounds
on the communication in a way analogous to our 1-server lowerbounds. In particular,
the appropriate quantum analog of Ablayev’s lower bound (Fact 3.3.2) turns out to be the
following lower bound for quantum random access codes, due to Nayak [Nay99].
Theorem 3.4.2.(Nayak) For an encoding x7→ ρx of n-bit strings into m-qubit states with
recovery probability of at least p, m has to be≥ (1 − H (p))n.
Kerenidis and de Wolf use the following theorem to reduce local y decodable codes to
locally quantum decodable codes.
Theorem 3.4.3.(Kerenidis & de Wolf) A(2, δ, ǫ)-LDC is a(1, δ,4ǫ/7)-LQDC.
Finally, Kerenidis and de Wolf apply Theorem 3.4.2 to get thelower bound.
We now outline Kerenidis and de Wolf’s argument, using our own terminology. We
find it convenient to remove the intermediate steps of a quantum PIR scheme and a quan-
tum random access code; instead, we show that a 2-server PIR scheme with sufficiently
good parameters implies a one-wayquantumcommunication protocol forINDEXn. The
aforementioned result of Nayak [Nay99] can be restated thus.
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Fact 3.4.4.A one-way quantum communication protocol forINDEXn with error probability
ε must communicate at least(1 − H (ε))n qubits.
This gives us the desired PIR lower bound.
The following theorem is the 1-bit result of Kerenidis and deWolf as restated in our
notation.
Theorem 3.4.5.Any2-server(ℓq,1; ε,0)-PIR protocol hascost(P) ≥ ℓq ≥ (1−H (11/14−
4ε/7))n − 2.
Proof. SupposeP is a 2-server(ℓq,1; ε, δ)-PIR protocol, given by(Q,Ans,Rec), that uses
ρ bits of randomness. We associate withP a certain collection{|φ j y〉} of (ρ+4+ℓa)-qubit
quantum states. To define these, we use the basis states{|r, i, i, z〉 : r ∈ {0,1}ρ, i ∈
{0,1,2}, z ∈ {0,1}ℓq}. We setc := 1/
√
3 · 2ρ and, for notational convenience, we define
Q0( j , r ) = 0ℓq and Ans0(y, z) = 0 for all j ∈ [n], r ∈ {0,1}ρ, y ∈ {0,1}n andz ∈ {0,1}ℓq .
Also, for (i, j , z) ∈ {0,1,2} × [n] × {0,1}ℓq , we define the setSi j z := {r ∈ {0,1}ρ :
Qi ( j , r ) = z}. Finally, we define|φ j y〉 as follows:





|0,0,0ℓq 〉 + (−1)Ans1(y,Q1( j ,r ))|1,1,Q1( j , r )〉 + (−1)Ans2(y,Q2( j ,r ))|2,2,Q2( j , r )〉
)
.
The significance of this quantum state is brought out in the following fact, implicit in the
work of Kerenidis and de Wolf.
Fact 3.4.6(Kerenidis and de Wolf [KdW03]). By measuring|φ j y〉 in an appropriate basis,
independent of j and y, followed by classical postprocessing, one can obtain a bit that
equals yj with probability at least11/14− 4ε/7.
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To see how this fact can be used to obtain the desired communication protocol, note that






















|χi j z〉 · (−1)Ansi (y,z)c
√
|Si j z| |i, z〉 ,
where |χi j z〉 := |Si j z|−1/2
∑
r∈Si j z |r, i 〉. Let U j be a unitary transformation that maps
|0ρ,0, i, z〉 to |χi j z〉|i, z〉. The protocol forINDEXn works as follows. Alice, on inputy,
prepares the quantum state








|Si j z| |i, z〉 (3.1)
and sends it to Bob. Although it seems at first glance that|ψ j y〉 depends onj , it in fact does





[Qi ( j , R) = z] = Pr
R




Bob, upon receiving|ψ j y〉, constructs the state|0ρ,0〉|ψ j y〉 usingρ qubits of his own and
appliesU j to it, obtaining the state|φ j y〉. He then uses the procedure implied by Fact 3.4.6
to compute his output bit, which is correct with probabilityat least 11/14 − 4ε/7. Since
|ψ j y〉 is a(2+ ℓq)-qubit state, the communication cost of this protocol is 2+ ℓq. Fact 3.4.4
now implies thatℓq ≥ (1 − H (11/14− 4ε/7))n − 2, giving us a lower bound on cost(P).
3.4.3 The nearly private1-bit case
Without perfect privacy, the argument of the previous subsection does not work. This is
because Equation (3.2) no longer holds, which makes the above quantum communication
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protocol ill-defined: Alice can no longer prepare the state|ψ j y〉 because itmight depend
on j , which Alice does not know. However, we shall show that Alicecan get away with
sending Bob the state|ψ1y〉, provided a sufficiently strong privacy guarantee holds.
Theorem 3.4.7.Letε andδ be sufficiently small positive reals. Then any2-server(ℓq,1; ε, δ)-
PIR protocol hasℓq ≥ (1− H (3/4+2δ/3−
√
2δ−ε))n. In particular, the communication
cost of such a protocol is at leastε,δ(n).
Proof. We use the framework and notation of Section 3.4.1. SupposeP is a 2-server
(ℓq,1; ε, δ)-PIR protocol. Consider the following one-way communication protocol for
INDEXn: Alice, on inputy, sends Bob the(2 + ℓq)-qubit quantum state|ψ1y〉. Bob, upon
receiving it, constructs the state|0ρ〉|ψ1y〉 defined by Eq. (3.1) and applies the unitary trans-
formationU j to it. He then measures the resulting state|φ′j y〉 as mentioned in Fact 3.4.6.
Examining the details of Kerenidis and de Wolf’s argument, we see that, for eachr ∈
{0,1}ρ , measuring|φ j y〉 would have correctly obtained the pair of bits(Ans1(y,Q1( j , r )),Ans2(y,Q2( j , r )))
with probability at least 3/4. Let us eschew the additional “11/14 trick” used in that argu-
ment and instead consider the probabilityp of obtaining this same outcome by measuring
Bob’s state|φ′j y〉. Let |µ〉 be the vector in the measurement basis corresponding to the
desired outcome, so that|〈µ|φ j y〉|2 ≥ 3/4. Then






− ‖|φ j y〉 − |φ′j y〉‖2 . (3.3)
Now,
‖|φ j y〉 − |φ′j y〉‖
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2 = ‖|0
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where Eq. (3.4) holds becauseU j is unitary, and Eq. (3.5) is obtained by invoking Eq. (3.1).
SinceP has privacy parameterδ, for i ∈ {1,2} we have
∑
z∈{0,1}ρ ||Si j z| − |Si1z|| ≤ 2ρδ.



















Since Bob eschews the classical postprocessing (the “11/14trick”), the probability that he
correctly outputsy j is at least the above quantity minus the probability that thePIR scheme
errs, i.e., at least 3/4 + 2δ/3 −
√
2δ − ε. The theorem follows.
3.5 Nearly private bounds using other measures
3.5.1 Hellinger distance
Hellinger distance between two distributions with densitie p andq over the space with










The following bounds on it are known.
1
2
D2H (p,q) ≤ ‖p − q‖1 ≤ DH (p,q).
If we use Hellinger distance as a measure of similarity betwen distributions and declare
that a private information scheme is nearly private with privacy parameterδ in Hellinger
sense, this scheme will also be nearly private with privacy parameterδ in L1 sense.
Therefore, if we use Hellinger distance instead ofL1 distance, all the negative results
of this thesis will still hold.
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3.5.2 Relative entropy
Relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler distance between twodistributions with densitiesp













Therefore, if we were to use Kullback-Leibler distance instead ofL1 distance, a scheme
that is nearly private with privacy parameterδ in the Kullback-Leibler sense would also be
private with privacy parameter
√
(2 ln 2)δ in L1 sense. The negative results of this chapter
would hold if we substitute
√
(2 ln 2)δ for δ.
3.5.3 Mutual information
Consider the mutual informationI between the indexj and the queryQi ( j , r ). If the
information is 0, the serveri knows nothing about the indexj after getting the query, and
therefore the scheme is perfectly private.
Consider the case of one server and perfect recovery, and letI = δ. An easy upper
bound can be achieved by writing down the indexj in binary and transmittingδ first bits
as a query. In order to guarantee perfect recovery, the server needs only to transmit bits at
the indices starting with the query, therefore the total communication will beδ + n/2δ (as
opposed ton in the perfectly private case). We conjecture that the lowerbound isn/2δ.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and future work
In my graduate work I have shown a number of privacy-related results united by the com-
mon theme of allowing less than perfect privacy in schemes where formerly only or mostly
perfect privacy was considered. The field of privacy schemesis full of possibilities for
trade-offs that frequently allow getting useful properties.
We introduced web caches as a useful tool for anonymous web-browsing. Future work
could include web caches that are specifically targetted towards this goal. Note that our
present analysis concentrated on using existing caching systems. However, it is natural to
pose a different question, namely: how should an anonymity-friendly caching system be
designed from the ground up? In particular, an interesting drection of research would be
methods for handling dynamic content without sacrificing too much user privacy. It would
be interesting to do a user study on web-browsing patterns. Such a study may show that
less protection is required for web browsing that involves dynamic content due to the high
variability of requests for such content.
For example, it could be interesting to look at the publisheddataset of AOL search
queries to see what amount of queries made by the same users could still be associated if
the users’ IPs were hidden, what amount of queries would bepersonwhacks- i.e., similarly
to googlewhacks, allowing to uniquely identify the person they refer to. It is possible that
merely hiding users’ IPs from the search engine would significantly impair the ability of the
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search engine operator to correlate queries as belonging tothe same user. In particular, hid-
ing users’ IPs may dissociate queries containing personally identifiable information from
queries containing information that the users might want toconceal. Perhaps a caching
proxy could be combined with another anonymizing system, for example Tor, to allow ac-
cess to certain types of dynamic content without incurring agre t loss of privacy. Here, as in
numerous other cases, the composition of several security sys ems may exhibit unexpected
properties not present in the components.
We produced a coercion-resistant voter verifiable electronic voting scheme. In the future
this scheme could be made more practical and voter-friendly. It may be worth the effort
(and certainly necessary if there is a possibility for ever getting the system used in the field)
to attempt to give each component a crisp, intuitive, and user-friendly look. Currently,
digests of cryptographic keys, such as ssh keys and PGP keys are presented to the user as
long strings of characters; however, humans are not really comfortable with comparing (as
well as processing or remembering) such strings. Various idnumbers and signatures used
in our scheme could benefit from being presented in a more user-friendly form. Trade-
offs between usability and protection from possible attacks may also be worth exploring.
It would also be interesting to look at extending the system to support different types of
elections (whereas currently our scheme only allows the votr t choose one candidate). It
would be interesting to conduct a user study to see if our scheme actually achieves voter
trust - namely, if the non-technical users trying it out would have the impression that they
can indeed verify that their vote made it to the tally.
We studied the generalization of private information retrieval to nearly private informa-
tion retrieval and proved a number of new bounds on the amountof communication required
in nearly private information retrieval schemes. We have found that in the 1-server case and
in the binary 2-server case relaxing the privacy requirements o a private information re-
trieval (PIR) scheme by allowing it to leak a small amount of information about the client’s
index does not allow more than a constant factor improvementin the communication cost.
The question of whether improvements can be obtained for thegen ral 2-server case re-
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mains open. The generalization to nearly private information retrieval for the case of 3 or
more servers so far also remains an entirely unexplored topic hat may be worth addressing
in the future. It would also be interesting to see whether schemes with small mutual infor-
mation between the index and the corresponding query could be more efficient or whether
the conjectured lower bound holds.
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